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Abstract—We present our research towards the design of a
computational framework capable of modelling the formation
and evolution of global patterns (i.e. group structures) in a
population of social individuals. The framework is intended to
be used in collaborative environments, e.g. social serious games
and computer simulations of artificial societies. The theoretical
basis of our research, together with current state of the art and
future work, are briefly introduced.
I. INTRODUCTION
The interactions among a population of social individuals
(agents) — due to factors such as the agents’ attitude, per-
sonality, cultural biases and stereotypes, and history of past
interactions [1] — yield complex dynamics which lead to
the formation of global patterns, intended as the behaviour
of the system as a whole [2]. Global patterns, such as group
identities and norms, influence the behaviour of the individuals
in an indirect, implicit manner [2], with the potential threat
of generating and aggravating social conflicts, such as social
discriminations and other forms of inequalities. The ability to
monitor the formation of global patterns, model their structures
and their influence on the society is important, as it will not
only provide an instrument for understanding the causes of
social conflicts, but will also contribute to the evaluation of
the effectiveness of intervention methods. A way to effectively
detect global pattern formations is through modelling the local-
to-global transition (e.g. from agent interactions to group
structures). However, doing so is not a trivial task due to
the recurrent influence of the global structure in the society-
system1.
The main questions this research intends to answer to are:
(1) is it possible to create a computational model capable
to represent the local-to-global transition? (2) is it possible
to predict the formation and evolution of global patterns,
and infer characteristics of their internal structures? (3) what
constitutes the indirect mechanism and how does it influence
the agents? (4) is it possible to intervene at the global level
(e.g. by means of regulations) in order to affect the behaviour
of the local level? As our research is informed by the Complex
Adaptive Systems (CAS) literature [1], [2], our intention is
to leverage the concepts, theories and findings of social and
behavioural sciences in identifying the emergent properties of
1Sometimes it is referred to as emergence of complexity [1]
complex systems [3]. Our research is structured into four areas
of investigation: (1) exploration of existing theories on global
pattern formation; these are usually qualitative and focus on
aspects of interaction which are abstract and complex (i.e.
collaboration and fairness); (2) formalisation of the theories
through computational measures and learning algorithms, and
contextualisation of them in realistic social scenarios, such as
social dilemmas; (3) implementation of the social scenarios in
computer simulations of artificial societies [4], [5]; which will
facilitate preliminary validation of our models; (4) extension
of application of our models and social scenarios to human-
based collaborative (virtual) environments, such as multiplayer
games, which will enable final evaluation of the effectiveness
of our models.
As such, global pattern modelling represents a new tool for
the creation of educational environments (serious games) that
convey concepts like conflict, collaboration, and fairness. Fur-
ther afield than educational environments, global pattern mod-
elling may contribute to research fields such as behavioural and
social sciences, evolutionary dynamics, collective behaviour,
as well as macroeconomics and political sciences.
II. STATE OF OUR RESEARCH
We are currently conducting experiments based on artificial
societies to establish optimal learning algorithms and metrics
for detecting consolidated group identities (i.e. the ability of
an individual to identify himself or herself with his or her
group [6]) in the population. The agents interact with each
other by means of the social ultimatum bargain game [7].
Several initial configurations representing different group iden-
tities (which imply social preferences [8]) have been defined
and are being maintained, that is, the agents will not adapt their
behaviours in response to behavioural dynamics. We are now
going to briefly describe the society’s interaction protocol and
the structure of the Group Modelling framework (GM) which
would allow us to detect group identities.
A. The Social Ultimatum Bargain Game in Use
The interaction protocol is hereby briefly introduced. (1) a
population P of n agents are first divided into m partitions
P ; (2) for each partition, an agent ai is randomly selected
to become the provider agent of the social ultimatum bargain
game, all the other agents of the partition become receiver
agents; (3) the provider agent bargains with each receiver agent
over an equal endowment e. For each bargain, ai proposes an
offer 0 ≤ oi,j ≤ e to receiver agent aj ; according to the social
relationship between the agents — which are consequence
of the agents’ group identities — the offers will variate in
generosity [8]; (4) aj can either accept the offer or refuse it;
(5) the final outcome for aj is either 0 or oi,j ; the final outcome
for ai is the sum of all the (e− oi,j) accepted bargains.
B. Measuring Levels of Cooperation
To detect the existence of sub-groups in the population,
and to assign a group identity to the individuals, we analyse
the different levels of cooperation amongst the agents through
their interactions [6]. Our hypothesis is that by observing the
level of cooperation [10] of a provider agent with respect to the
whole partition Pk, we can understand which receiver agents
he prefers to bargain with. This would imply that he is more
altruistic and collaborative [10] with some of the agents in
the partition, hence is more likely to share the same group
identity.
For the current state of our research we are considering
both deterministic and stochastic metrics of provider agent’s
favourability which return a value indicating whether the
agents under consideration belong to the same group or not
(in/out-group values [6]). We will refer to the metrics as
interaction classifiers, denoted with I.
C. Learning Collaboration
To learn cooperation values among the individuals which
encompass the history of past interactions [1] we are currently
considering the following Constant-α Monte Carlo update rule
for non-stationary environments [9]:
Ci,j(t) = Ci,j(t− 1) + α [It − Ci,j(t)] (1)
Ci,j(t) is the cooperation value between the provider agent
ai and the receiver agent aj up to the t-th interaction, It
is the level-of-cooperation-value computed by the interaction
classifier introduced in Section II-B, and α is a constant step-
size parameter. Finally, collaboration values are obtained by
considering reciprocal altruism [1], [10] through the following
equation:
C4i,j(t) =
1
2
(Ci,j + Cj,i) (2)
D. Detecting Group Identities
The collaboration values C4i,j are then used as a dissimilarity
matrix by a clustering algorithm. The number of group identi-
ties and the corresponding agents are then determined. We are
currently investigating the use of the complete-link clustering
algorithm with elbow rule as validity method.
III. FUTURE WORK
Our future work will follow four concurrent paths. First, we
will seek for the best methods and parameters in order to make
our framework robust with respect to the size of the society
(n), locality (m) and partial observability of the interactions
(m). On that basis, ongoing research on the definition of a
group-based metric of fairness is being conducted. As fairness
of offer distribution is an abstract, subjective, and ambiguous
term we designed several ad-hoc metrics of fairness based
on key and generic elements of fair offers, such as the
amount of the offer and the need of the receivers. We then
tested those against human notions of fairness, by running a
crowdsourcing experiment in which participants were asked
to compare levels of fairness of dissimilar offer distribution
scenarios in a resource management game environment [11].
Preliminary results suggest that some of our fairness metrics
are consistent with human notions of fairness and are both
accurate and robust across different game scenarios and levels
of fairness distribution complexity. Second, we will enrich the
level of complexity of the artificial agents, e.g. by representing
affect and enabling adaptation; we will also augment the
possibilities of social interactions by introducing other social
dilemmas, such as the tragedy of the commons [6]. Third, we
will investigate methods for modelling the internal group struc-
tures, such as leaderships and norms [12], and the between-
group dynamics (e.g. evolution). We will also investigate
methods to intervene at global level (e.g. by modifying the
interaction protocols) in order to affect, in a feedback loop, the
behaviour of the society, in order to achieve envisaged goals,
such as the maximisation of collaboration or the reduction
of social inequalities. Finally, we will consider game-based
environment, and will increase its level of abstraction by
concealing money-related notions and instead representing
social conflict scenarios [10].
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